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Abstract
The 1990 U.S. Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) instituted a national program in tradable
sulfur dioxide (SO2) emission permits, referred to as “emission allowances,” in the U.S. electricity sector.
This paper provides a survey and assessment of the SO2 allowance trading program with a focus on the
role of innovation. Over the last decade the cost of compliance has fallen dramatically compared with
most expectations, and today the total cost of the program is 40– 140% lower than projections (depending
on the timing of those projections and the counter-factual baseline considered). Marginal costs of
reductions are less than one-half the cost considered in most analyses at the time the program was
introduced.
Innovation accounts for a large portion of these cost savings, but not as typically formulated in
economic models of research and development (R&D) efforts to obtain patent discoveries. Innovation
under the SO2 allowance trading program involves organizational innovation at the firm, market and
regulatory level and process innovation by electricity generators and upstream fuel suppliers. An
important portion of the cost reductions that are evident was already in the works prior to and independent
of the program. Nonetheless, the allowance trading program deserves significant credit for providing the
incentive and flexibility to accelerate and to fully realize exogenous technical changes that were occurring
in the industry. This marks a significant departure from conventional approaches to environmental
regulation, which would not be expected to capture these savings. The ongoing transition to restructuring
of electricity markets and expanding competition in electricity generation complements the design of the
SO2 allowance trading program by providing firms with full incentives to reduce costs of pollution
control.
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Innovation Under the Tradable Sulfur Dioxide Emission Permits
Program in the U.S. Electricity Sector
Dallas Burtraw∗
1. Introduction
Title IV of the 1990 U.S. Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) instituted an emission
allowance trading program to regulate emissions of sulfur dioxide ( SO2) from electricity-
generating facilities. The industry is allocated a fixed number of total allowances, and firms are
required to hold one allowance for each ton of sulfur dioxide they emit. Firms are allowed to
transfer allowances among facilities or to other firms or to bank them for use in future years.
A less widely acknowledged but equally important feature of Title IV is the annual cap
on average aggregate emissions by electricity generators, which is set at about one-half of the
amount emitted in 1980. The cap accommodates an allowance bank, so that in any one year,
aggregate industry emissions must be equal to or less than the number of allowances allocated
for the year plus the surplus that has accrued from previous years.
For years economists have urged that policy makers use incentive-based approaches
(taxes or tradable permits) to control pollution to encourage industry to minimize the cost of
reducing emissions. A conventional approach to environmental regulation might force firms to
emit SO2 at a uniform rate or to install specific control technology. The trading program is
designed to enable firms operating at high marginal pollution abatement costs to purchase SO2
emission allowances from firms operating at lower marginal abatement costs, thereby limiting
SO2 emissions at a lower overall cost than traditional command-and-control approaches.
Incentive-based approaches to regulation also are believed to encourage industry to
minimize costs over time, promoting so-called “dynamic efficiency.” This dynamic efficiency is
achieved by providing firms with an incentive to innovate, because firms can expect to keep
some or all of the gains from innovation through reduced abatement costs plus reduced payments
                                                
∗  Burtraw is a Senior Fellow at Resources for the Future. This paper was prepared for the OECD Workshop On
Innovation and the Environment, 19 June, 2000. The author owes a debt for many of the ideas in this paper to Curtis
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for taxes or permits. Such incentives to innovate are typically weak or absent with conventional
regulatory approaches, especially those that use technology standards, which provide little
reward to the development of alternative technologies or processes.1
A significant literature has investigated the expected performance of different
environmental policy instruments in promoting research and development (R&D). Most of the
literature has argued that incentive-based approaches provide greater incentives for innovation
than conventional approaches (e.g., Downing and White 1986). Milliman and Prince (1989) and
Jung, Krutilla and Boyd (1996) find that among incentive-based instruments, the incentives for
innovation are greatest under auctioned emission permits, less with an emissions tax, and least
under free (grandfathered) emissions permits. These three policies are all found to be more
effective than direct controls or performance standards. Fischer, Parry and Pizer (1999) analyze
the incentive-based instruments and find that depending on the circumstances, each one of the
three policies may induce a significantly higher welfare gain (including environmental benefits)
than the other two. The relative ranking depends on the ability of adopting firms to imitate the
innovation, as well as the cost of research and development and the nature of environmental
benefits. In general, the literature offers the following broad consensus:  while not as important
as the environmental benefits that are achieved (Parry, Pizer, and Fischer 2000) or even as
important as achieving cost-effectiveness in the short run, incentive-based approaches offer
important advantages over conventional approaches in reducing the long-term cost of pollution
control.
The SO2 allowance market presents the first real test of the wisdom of economists' advice
and therefore merits careful evaluation. How has trading affected the distribution of benefits and
costs in the program? Has the allowance market significantly lowered the costs of abating SO2?
And most central to this paper: compared to other conventional regulatory approaches for
controlling pollution, how has the program affected the nature and pace of innovation?
                                                
1 Another type of dynamic efficiency promoted by incentive-based regulation is so-called “allocative efficiency.”
Allocative efficiency occurs because these approaches internalize some portion of the social cost of economic
activity. For example, environmental taxes invoke costs associated with abatement activity (as do command-and–
control approaches) and also invoke costs associated with the tax payments, thereby having a greater effect on
product prices than just the cost of abatement. Similarly, tradable permits invoke abatement activity and also invoke
costs associated with the opportunity cost of using a permit that could otherwise be sold to another firm. In a
competitive market, this opportunity cost would be added to the cost of abatement in determining marginal costs of
production. The consequence is to provide a more accurate signal of resource use in product prices both to
consumers and to potential entrants in the market (Spulber 1985).Resources for the Future Burtraw
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This paper addresses these issues by surveying  the recent literature to assess the actual
performance and success of the allowance trading program and then by attributing this success to
various sources, including innovation. First, the paper provides a basic description of the
program and the historical setting in which it emerged. Second, the paper addresses the
environmental performance and the cost of the program, especially compared with the expected
cost of the allowance trading program and the cost of conventional regulatory approaches.
Subsequently, the paper turns to a survey of innovations that can be attributed to the program.
The conclusion offered, in brief, is that the SO2 allowance trading program has been a
noteworthy success from the standpoint of comparing benefits and costs. Emission allowance
trading has not lessened, and may have contributed to, the environmental benefits of SO2
reduction. Meanwhile, trading has contributed to significant cost reductions, compared to
original forecasts of cost.
Innovation also accounts for a large portion of these cost reductions, but not simply in the
way typically formulated in economic models of the research and development of patentable
discoveries. This observation is consistent with the sparse empirical literature on the economic
incentives for innovation created by environmental and energy regulation. Jaffe and Palmer
(1997) found a positive relationship between regulatory stringency and R&D expenditures but no
statistically significant relationship between compliance costs and patenting activity at the
industry level.
In the SO2 allowance trading program, flexibility in compliance has provided the lion’s
share of cost savings to date—a greater share than the exchange of emission allowances through
trading. Similarly, Kerr and Newell (1997) investigated lead-reducing technology adoption
decisions by petroleum refineries during the phase-down of lead in gasoline and found that
changes in regulatory flexibility led to noticeable differences in technology responses across
firms.
Also in the SO2 program, input markets for electricity generation redirected investment
dollars to take advantage of new opportunities for low-sulfur coal that were created by the SO2
emission allowance trading program. Similarly, Newell, Jaffe, and Stavins (1997) explored the
effect of economic incentives and direct regulation on energy-saving innovation, finding that
manufacturers significantly redirected product-level innovation in an energy-efficiency
enhancing direction during periods of energy price increases.
Generally, rather than patentable discoveries, innovation under the SO2 allowance trading
program has involved organizational innovation at the firm, market, and regulatory level andResources for the Future Burtraw
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process innovation by electricity generators and upstream fuel suppliers. An important portion of
the cost reductions was already in the works, independent of the trading program. Nonetheless, a
conventional regulatory approach would have failed to capitalize on many of these advantageous
trends, and arguably would have discouraged them The SO2 allowance trading program deserves
significant credit for providing the incentive and flexibility to accelerate and fully realize
exogenous technical changes that were occurring in the industry.
2. Institutional Background
Since 1970, the SO2 emissions of electric utilities have been regulated in order to achieve
federally-mandated local air quality standards (the National Ambient Air Quality Standards). For
plants in existence in 1970, these standards, codified in state implementation plans, typically
have taken the form of maximum emission rates (pounds of SO2 per million Btus of heat input).
Plants built after 1970 are subject to the New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) set at the
federal level. Since 1978, NSPS for coal-fired power plants effectively have required the
installation of capital-intensive flue gas desulfurization equipment (scrubbers) to reduce SO2
emissions, which was an attempt to protect the jobs of coal miners in states with high-sulfur coal.
In areas where emissions could have been reduced more cheaply by switching to low-sulfur coal,
this regulation has significantly raised the costs of SO2 abatement at new plants.
During the 1980s, more than 70 bills were introduced in Congress to reduce SO2
emissions from power plants, especially those existing before the NSPS took effect. Some bills
would have forced the scrubbing of emissions from all electricity-generating units, while others,
to give firms some opportunity to choose a compliance strategy, would have provided limited
flexibility by imposing uniform emission rate standards.
The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments for regulating SO2 move away from these types of
uniformly applied regulations. Instead, reductions are to be achieved by setting a cap on
emissions while allowing the trading of marketable pollution permits or allowances. The
eventual goal is to cap average annual SO2 emissions of electric utilities at 8.95 million tons—
about half of the 1980 level. This is to be achieved in two phases. In Phase I, which began in
1995, each of the 110 dirtiest power plants (which have 263 generating units) were allocated
allowances sufficient for an emission rate of 2.5 pounds SO2 per million Btus of heat input.
Firms can voluntarily enroll additional generating units (“Compensation and Substitution” units)
in Phase I, subject to the constraint that the average emission rate of all units does not increase.
In Phase II, which began in the year 2000, all fossil-fueled power plants larger than 25
megawatts are annually allocated allowances sufficient for an emission rate of 1.2 pounds of SO2Resources for the Future Burtraw
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per million Btus heat input. In both phases, heat input is based on the 1985–1987 reference
period.
The key features of the SO2 allowance trading program are themselves innovative. The
primary focus is concern for the environment that is addressed through significant  reductions in
aggregate emissions. The firm national cap on emissions ensures these reductions will be
maintained even as the economy and electricity demand grow in the future. Measurement of
emissions ensures the cap will be met.
Additional key features are flexibility and simplicity. While I discuss the importance of
flexibility at length, suffice it to say that simplicity in the program’s design makes the program
transparent to industry and environmental advocates alike, while also building trust in its
performance. Automatic penalties remove the role of negotiation and uncertainty in the case of
noncompliance. Finally, the program is national, but it does not supercede local standards that
are set to protect human health and guard against potential local hot spots of pollution.
Allowance trading takes advantage of the fact that emission control costs vary across
generating units and encourages firms with the cheapest control costs to undertake the greatest
emission reductions. Unfortunately, firms may not have adequate incentives to minimize SO2
compliance costs because of decisions made by some state public utility commissions (Rose
1997; Bohi 1994; Bohi and Burtraw 1992). For instance, to protect the jobs of miners in high-
sulfur coal states, some regulators pre-approved the recovery of investment in scrubbers, while
leaving it uncertain whether the cost of other possible compliance measures would be similarly
recoverable. The allowance trading program itself encouraged scrubbing, for the explicit purpose
of protecting jobs in regions with high-sulfur coal, by allocating 3.5 million bonus allowances to
firms that installed scrubbers as the means of compliance. In addition, investments in scrubbers
can be depreciated and in some cases expensed (deducted against taxable income) as soon as the
scrubber is installed. In contrast, in many states the cost of purchased allowances cannot be
recovered until they are used for compliance (Lile and Burtraw 1998). These facts suggest that—
through no fault of its own—the allowance market might not succeed in capturing all the
potential gains from emission trading
3. Environmental Performance
Facilities affected by the allowance trading program have been 100% in compliance. The
opportunity to bank emission allowances for use in later years, especially those of Phase II for
which the annual allocation of allowances is decreased significantly, led to significant over-Resources for the Future Burtraw
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compliance during Phase I. Of course, this means the postponement of emissions, rather than
their elimination. This section describes what is known about the environmental benefits of the
program from an economic perspective, including the environmental effects of trading and
banking.
Comparing benefits and costs
The primary measure of success of the SO2 allowance trading program, from the
perspective of economics, should be the comparison of benefits and costs. Burtraw et al. (1998)
report the results of an integrated assessment of the benefits and costs through the year 2030,
with benefits quantified for health, visibility, and lake recreation. Midpoint estimates of the
benefits and costs per affected capita for the year 2010 are summarized in Table 1. The costs and
benefits estimates are not additive, because they do not describe consistent geographic areas.
Costs and health benefits are calculated for the entire nation. Visibility benefits are calculated at
selected cities or states. Lake recreation benefits are calculated for the Adirondacks only. Hence,
the values are expressed per affected capita to illustrate the potential relative magnitude of these
benefits.
The study finds that benefits of the SO2 allowance trading program are an order of
magnitude greater than costs, a result that contrasts sharply with estimates in 1990 that pegged
benefits about equal to costs (Portney 1990). What explains the difference between the earlier
and recent estimates?
On the cost side, compliance has and will cost in the future one-half or less of what was
anticipated in 1990, a point I subsequently consider in detail.
Meanwhile, the lion’s share of benefits results from reduced risk of premature mortality,
especially through reduced exposure to sulfates. These expected benefits measure several times
the expected costs of the program. Significant benefits are also estimated for improvements in
health morbidity, recreational visibility, and residential visibility, and benefits for each of these
measures are approximately equal to costs. These areas, namely human health and visibility,
were not the focus of acid rain research in the 1980s, and new information about health
epidemiology suggests these benefits are greater than were previously anticipated (Burtraw et al.
1998).
In contrast, benefit areas that were the focus of attention in the 1980s, including effects to
soils, forests and aquatic systems, still have not been modeled comprehensively, but evidence
suggests benefits in these areas to be relatively small. It is surprising to many that relatively lowResources for the Future Burtraw
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benefits are expected to result from effects of acid rain reduction on forests and agriculture or are
estimated by economists for improvements in lake recreation (see Burtraw et al. 1998). One
reason is that willingness to pay for environmental improvement depends on the availability of
substitute assets. Economists would not expect changes in quality at one site to elicit large
benefits if there are many sites available for comparable recreational opportunities. In contrast,
individuals do not have the same kind of substitution possibilities with respect to health and
visibility, which may help explain the relatively larger benefit estimates for these endpoints.
Furthermore, one should note that the low benefit estimates stem from an assessment of use
values, or commodity values in the case of agriculture. Environmental changes may also yield
nonuse values, but estimates for nonuse values are not yet available. The evidence, based on a
small number of relatively narrow studies, suggests these values may be significant.
Table 1. Benefits and Costs per Affected Capita in 2010
Effect
Benefits and costs per affected capita of









Note: Benefits are not additive because affected populations differ. However, morbidity and mortality benefits and
costs are calculated for the entire nation. Source: Burtraw et al. (1998).
There are huge uncertainties, especially on the benefits side of the ledger and especially
in valuation of mortality. Recent economic critiques have argued that the use of the value of a
statistical life as the basis for valuing health risks from air pollution, instead of a more
appropriate measure of quality-adjusted life years lost, could grossly overestimate mortality
benefits. In addition, economists have questioned the appropriateness of using labor studies of
prime-age men to value changes in life expectancy that occur among an older population
(Johannesson and Johansson, 1996; Krupnick et al. 2000). On the other hand, because
environmental exposures are involuntary while labor market risks are assumed to be voluntary inResources for the Future Burtraw
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nature, the labor market studies may underestimate willingness to pay to avoid environmental
exposures.
Burtraw, Harrison and Turner (1998) used Monte Carlo analysis and a parametric one-
sided sensitivity analysis to investigate some of these sources of uncertainties. Their analysis
finds that there is no year in which health benefits of the SO2 emission reduction program at the
5% confidence interval are less than the annualized (levelized) expected costs. As noted,
significant benefits are also estimated for improvements in health morbidity, recreational
visibility, and residential visibility, each of which yields benefits approximately equal to costs.
Despite tremendous uncertainties about benefits and costs, the main conclusion that benefits
soundly outweigh costs appears to be robust.
The effects of banking
The banking provision of the SO2 allowance trading program resulted in an accumulated
surplus of allowances of more than 11 million tons by the year 2000, when Phase II of the
program began. Beginning in 2000, allowance allocations to Phase I facilities were decreased,
and additional facilities were covered by the program; it is expected that the allowance bank will
be diminished over a period of several years.
The opportunity to bank allowances plays a significant role in reducing compliance cost,
because it affords firms the flexibility to plan their investment activities. However, it has an
ambiguous effect on benefits. To build up a bank, firms are expected to take advantage of
relatively low-cost compliance options in the early years of the program, resulting in lower
emissions than would occur were firms not able to bank allowances. This leads to greater
environmental benefits in the early years. However, after 2000 when the bank is drawn down,
emissions are expected to be greater than would occur absent the opportunity to bank, and hence
environmental benefits are expected to be less.
The evaluation of the environmental consequences of banking is potentially complicated,
depending on whether there are threshold effects in environmental or public health response and
at what level of exposure those are achieved. The dominant view in health epidemiology
regarding exposure to particulates is that the concentration-response function is linear over the
range in which changes will occur. Hence, at least with respect to public health, the trade-off of
exposure and response in the later years for less exposure and response in the near term is neutral
with respect to the effect on health. From an economic perspective, benefits achieved sooner areResources for the Future Burtraw
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viewed as superior to benefits achieved later, owing to discounting. However, population growth
implies that greater numbers of people potentially will be exposed in the future.
Burtraw and Mansur (1999) explored this issue with a benefit-cost model (Burtraw et al.
1998; Bloyd et al. 1996) to compare two scenarios. One is a default scenario intended to
represent compliance with Title IV as it is taking shape. For comparison, they constructed a
scenario that was identical except that allowances could not be banked, so emissions in each
period must be less than or equal to allowance allocations in that period. Also, they assumed that
no scrubbers were built in Phase I, based on estimates from Carlson et al. (2000) suggesting that,
absent the bonus allowances, scrubbers were uneconomic, even with the opportunity to bank
allowances at those facilities.
The result of this comparison indicated emissions should fall or stay constant in 1995
compared to the default. However, in 2005 emissions will increase in most states and in the total
United States. The associated change in total health benefits (mortality and morbidity) that result
from the opportunity to bank were valued for 1995 and 2005. All numbers are in 1995 dollars,
but they were not present valued. The analysis indicated about $4 billion more in health benefits
in 1995; however, in 2005 there should be about $2.1 billion in decreased benefits. The harm is
less in 2005 than the improvement in 1995, but one should not be misled by this comparison,
because draw-down of the allowance bank is expected to occur over a longer horizon than did its
buildup. However, what one can conclude is that there is a fairly transparent trade-off between
near-term and longer-term emissions when banking is allowed. In general, the effect is to shift
emission reductions toward the present. Absent other scientific or social considerations, this
would seem to be a good thing, especially when it allows the emission reductions to be achieved
at significantly less cost.
Regional effects of trading
Legislative debates about acid rain in the 1980s had a sharp regional character. Since acid
deposition typically occurs far from the source of emissions, which are somewhat concentrated
in the Ohio Valley, many observers claimed that SO2 emissions from these Ohio Valley power
plants were contributing to environmental degradation in the Northeast. Long range transport of
emissions from the Ohio Valley does have an important effect outside the region. However, the
regional decomposition of health benefits from reduced emissions is less provincially divisive,
because atmospheric concentrations of SO2 and particulates that form from SO2 are affected
closer to the source of emissions than is acid deposition. Burtraw et al. (1998) found that,Resources for the Future Burtraw
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expressed in per capita terms, those states providing 75% of the emission reductions accrue
about 60% of total health benefits.
To explore the regional effects of trading, Burtraw and Mansur (1999) employed the
benefit-cost model to compare trading and no-trading scenarios in order to calculate the
distribution of benefits in the years 1995 and 2005 while holding the aggregate level of
emissions approximately constant.
To model this, Burtraw and Mansur (1999) chose to constrain aggregate emissions in the
no-trading scenario to equal those in the modeled baseline scenario(with trading). Figure 1
presents the results in a qualitative manner by illustrating that the effect of trading is to increase
emissions in the Ohio Valley, but not in a uniform way. In 2005, the effect of trading will be to
increase emissions from Illinois in percentage terms. For most states outside the Ohio Valley, the
effect of trading is to reduce emissions.
The more important measure is the effect of trading on health benefits. Figure 2
illustrates that trading undermines the health benefits of the program in areas closest to where
emissions increase. There has been significant concern that trading might serve to contribute to
the transboundary effects of pollution, with the result that citizens in New England and along the
Eastern Seaboard may suffer effects from emission increases in the Ohio Valley. However, those
increases in the Ohio Valley imply decreases in other states that have an equal or greater impact
on citizens in the East. As a consequence, it appears that trading actually leads to improvements
in air quality in the East. The conclusion is that trading has not led to a deterioration of air
quality or environmental assets in the Northeast, as some critics feared. Moreover, the slight
changes are not significant compared to the 50% reduction in aggregate emissions that are being
achieved (Swift 2000). In other applications of an emissions trading program, such as trading of
SO2 in Europe (Burtraw, Harrison and Turner, 1998) or NOx in the eastern United States, the
geographic effects of trading may be an issue that would have to be tackled directly in designing
a trading program. It does not appear to be important in the U.S. allowance trading program for
SO2.Resources for the Future Burtraw
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4. Cost Savings
Though they are substantial by any accounting, cost savings sometimes have been
exaggerated. Advocates of ambitious climate change policies have suggested that SO2 allowance
prices are “so low” and that economists and engineers got it “so wrong” that policy makers
should virtually ignore cost projections when developing new regulations such as a carbon or
NOx permit trading program. Some have claimed cost savings of nearly fifteen fold are
attributable to the trading program, based on a comparison of recent allowance prices of just
above $100 with projections of long-run marginal costs near $1500 per ton of abatement (see, for
example, Karmarck 1997).2
This argument is flawed for several reasons (Bohi and Burtraw 1997; Smith, Platt, and
Ellerman 1998). First, analyses that took into account the ultimate design of the program
suggested that long-run marginal costs would be about $700. Second, historical estimates of
marginal costs were generally for Phase II of the program, and therefore cannot be compared
with Phase I allowance prices unless the Phase II allowance price forecasts are discounted to the
present. The present discounted value in 2000 is roughly 40% of the value of costs incurred
around 2010, when Phase II is in full effect, and the allowance bank is expected to be depleted.
Third, marginal costs are likely to be a poor proxy for total costs (or cost savings). Even if
allowance price were equal to marginal abatement cost in the least-cost solution, it would not
follow that all trading gains were realized. Price can equal marginal abatement cost even if many
firms fail to participate in the market.
Together, these factors suggest that Phase I allowance prices in 1997 of about $125
should be compared to a figure of about $235, which is what U.S. EPA (1990) predicted would
obtain as Phase I marginal abatement costs in 1997.3 This comparison suggests that marginal
costs have fallen by more than half compared to the vantage point in 1990. Indeed, the
performance of the program is very good: there is no need to exaggerate.
                                                
2 See for example, ‘Economists’ Cold Forecast; Assumptions: Expect their dire predictions about the impact of the
global warming treaty on the United States. Ignore all of them,’ by Elaine Karmarck, Baltimore Sun, December 28,
1997.
3 U.S. EPA (1990) predicted $210 in  $1995 for the year 1995. Inflated at a 6% rate of interest, this is equivalent to
$235 for the year 1997.Resources for the Future Burtraw
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A critical question is: to what extent can this decline in cost be credited to the allowance
trading program? Subsequently, I ask the main question of interest: to what extent can this
decline be credited to innovation?
Marginal and annual costs
Carlson et al. (2000) offered an econometric model to explore the role of allowance
trading in achieving cost savings. To predict the cost of emissions reductions at fuel-switching
generators, the model used marginal abatement cost functions derived from an estimated long-
run cost function for electricity generation for more than 800 generating units for the years
1985–1994.4
To estimate potential gains from allowance trading in the long run, Carlson et al.
computed the least-cost solution to achieving the 8.95-million-ton SO2 cap in the year 2010.
Several assumptions are critical to the calculation, and they are explored in the sensitivity
analysis. Real prices of high- and low-sulfur coal are assumed to remain at 1995 levels while the
rate of technical change experienced between 1985 and 1994 continues through 2010. Baseline
emissions—those that would have prevailed absent Title IV—are calculated using 1993
emissions rates applied to 2010 levels of electricity production.
Under the above assumptions, the total annual cost of achieving the SO2 cap of 8.95
million tons in 2010 is estimated to be $1.01 billion (1995 dollars). Of this total, $380 million
represents the cost incurred by plants that fuel-switch, which account for about 60% of
reductions from baseline emissions, with the remainder incurred by plants that installed post-
combustion control. The marginal cost of emissions reduction, which should approximate the
long run permit price, is $291 per ton of SO2.
Annual compliance costs of $1 billion per year are less than half of the estimates of
compliance costs originally predicted when the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments were drafted
(U.S. EPA 1989, 1990). This is reported in the first row of Table 2.
                                                
4 The cost function treats fuel type (high-sulfur and low-sulfur coal), labor, and generating capital as fully variable
inputs. The econometric model consists of the cost function plus two share equations that specify the share of total
costs attributed to capital and labor and an equation for the firm's mean annual emission rate. The study uses a
translog form for the cost function, adding dummy variables for each plant in the database to measure fixed effects
that vary among the plants. Costs for units with scrubbers are taken directly from reported data.Resources for the Future Burtraw
14
Rows 2 and 3 report on the sensitivity analysis. Holding technology constant at 1995
levels, compared with the preferred assumption of continuing trends in technology
improvements, increases marginal abatement cost by about 50%. The assumption is that setting
fuel prices at 1989 levels, compared with the preferred assumption of 1995 levels, further
increases marginal abatement costs by nearly 20%.
These estimates can be compared with the U.S. EPA estimates from 1989 and 1990, at
the time the Clean Air Act Amendments were being discussed. The comparison illustrates that
the failure to anticipate changes in fuel prices, and the change in technology at the power plant
explains the difference between the Carlson et al. estimates and those that formed the basis of
expectations for the program. Under the maintained assumption that fuel switching determines
marginal abatement cost, the assumption of stable 1989 fuel prices and technology (the third row
of the table) produces marginal cost estimates approximately as large as those predicted when
Title IV was written (the fourth and fifth rows of the table).












Preferred Estimate * 1.0 291 174
w/ 1995 Technology 1.6 436 198
w/ 1989 Prices and
1989 Technology
1.9 560 236
U.S. EPA (1990) 2.3–5.9 579–760 299–457
U.S. EPA (1989) 2.7–6.2 377–511
Annual costs continue to differ significantly among these rows. A major factor explaining
the difference in annual cost is the assumption by the U.S. EPA in 1990 that a greater number of
scrubbers (37) would be built than were actually constructed in Phase I (28) or than are likely to
be built under the preferred estimate. Also, U.S. EPA (1990) failed to anticipate improvement in
performance of scrubbers, increased utilization of these units, and greater utilization of nuclear
units to meet baseload capacity. Since fuel switching is a marginal compliance option, theResources for the Future Burtraw
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estimates of marginal cost remain close in the comparison, but differences in scrubber estimates
help explain differences in infra-marginal costs and total cost.
Also important to total (annual) cost are differences in the baseline from which emissions
reductions are measured. In all of these calculations, the authors assume that the emission rates
(lb. of SO2/million Btus) that would have prevailed absent the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments
are those that prevailed in 1993. These are much lower than 1989 emission rates. Hence the
reductions in emissions necessary to achieve the 8.95-million-ton cap, by the authors’
calculations, are much lower than imagined in 1989 (specifically, about 2 million tons lower).
Holding marginal abatement cost curves constant, lowering the necessary reduction in emissions
will lower total compliance costs.
From these experiments, the characterization of technological change emerges as the
most important assumption in explaining the difference between the econometric estimates and
previous studies. Changing assumptions about other factors, such as fuel prices, retirement, and
monitoring each weigh in as significant but of much less importance. The important caveat is to
recognize that, to a large degree, these changes were exogenous to the SO2 allowance trading
program.
Potential Cost Savings from Allowance Trading
To calculate the cost savings from trading emission allowances, Carlson et al. (2000)
compare the cost of meeting the SO2 cap using a command-and-control approach with the least-
cost (preferred) solution identified above. The command-and-control approach is modeled as an
average emissions rate of 1.2 pounds of SO2 per million Btus of heat input.5 The estimated
potential gains from trading are $784 million, or about 44% of the cost of command-and-control.
While these potential gains are significant, they are not as large in absolute terms as were
originally predicted. The U.S. GAO (1994) estimated greater gains in both absolute and relative
terms, suggesting that a per-unit cap on emissions would cost approximately $5.3 billion
annually—140% more than their least-cost solution ($2.2 billion).
                                                
5 This approach already encompasses many of the beneficial incentives of the SO2 emissions allowance trading
program, compared to a technology-forcing approach, by providing individual facilities with flexibility in achieving
the standard. Other command-and-control approaches that were seriously considered in the US, such as forced
scrubbing at larger facilities, could have cost substantially more.Resources for the Future Burtraw
16
The explanation for relatively modest estimates of trading gains found by Carlson et al.
(2000) is that many of the factors that have caused marginal abatement costs to fall also would
have lowered the costs of achieving the SO2 emissions cap via some forms of command-and-
control policies. These factors include the fall in the price of low-sulfur coal and technical
improvements that have facilitated fuel switching. Burtraw (1996) suggests that incentives under
the allowance trading program have accelerated the pace at which these changes have occurred.
However, to the extent that these innovations would have emerged under a command-and-
control approach, they lower the potential cost savings from allowance trading as compared to a
command-and-control baseline.
In addition to lowering marginal abatement cost curves, the fall in low-sulfur coal prices
has made marginal abatement cost curves more homogeneous. This is because costs of
transporting low-sulfur coal to more distant locations, for example, the East and Southeast, has
fallen, rendering differences in transportation cost a less important component of the overall cost
of fuel switching. Because a major source of gains from allowance trading is differences in
marginal abatement cost curves among units in the market, this increased homogeneity is also
responsible for lowering gains from trading.
In summary, estimates of costs for both a command-and-control approach and allowance
trading have fallen over time owing to a number of factors. Allowance trading is resulting in cost
savings relative to a command-and-control approach, but the absolute magnitude of these savings
is expected to be somewhat less than previously envisioned owing to changes in fuel markets and
technology. These changes made the trading of allowances somewhat less important in reducing
costs, but the changes made the aspect of flexibility in a firm’s compliance decisions even more
important. Finally, note that Carlson et al. (2000) model a flexible type of command-and-control
policy (performance standards). A more rigid approach that forced firms to adopt specified
technologies would have precluded firms from taking advantage of the full range of options that
have emerged in compliance with the program. Compared to a more rigid command-and-control
policy, Carlson et al. (2000) conclude allowance trading could be argued to provide even greater
savings.
5. Innovation
Heretofore, we find the SO2 allowance trading program has realized tremendous cost
savings compared to a conventional approach and even compared to expectations at the time the
program was initiated. A portion of these savings is due to trading emission allowances, but aResources for the Future Burtraw
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large share of cost savings has been achieved outside the formal allowance market. The present
question of interest is: to what extent can the cost savings be attributed to innovation?
We find evidence of several forms of innovation, but one common feature in this
evidence is that the innovation generally is not patentable. Most of the innovations can be
catalogued as changes in production processes, organizational behavior, regulation, markets, etc.
An individual facility has a variety of mechanisms for compliance under Title IV in
addition to allowance trading, including intra-firm reallocation of emission allowances, fuel
switching and/or blending, installing scrubbers, retiring plants, repowering plants, energy
conservation, reduced utilization and substitution among facilities, and increased utilization of
lower-emitting facilities. To survey the role of innovation, I consider these compliance options,
including post-combustion control (scrubbing), as input supply. Subsequently I consider
innovations at the organizational level.
Technological Change at Input Supply Level
The most important development in the implementation of Title IV has been the fall of
prices in coal markets and of the operating cost of scrubbers. One explanation for this is the
unanticipated degree to which input markets have been brought into direct competition. SO2
allowance trading provides utilities with the flexibility to choose among several options for
compliance in addition to the purchase of allowances. This flexibility provides the opportunity
for vendors of various technologies to compete with emission reduction strategies at the power
plant, and this additional competition can ignite a wider search for ways to reduce costs among
suppliers of competing technologies. The result has been cost-reducing investments, resulting in
a decline in allowance prices below forecast in every potential option for compliance (Burtraw
1996).
The most visible changes have occurred in the delivered cost of low-sulfur coal. Under
the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments, there was little value to the sulfur differentiation in coal,
because the NSPS (Section 111 of the Clean Air Act) effectively forced adoption of specific
technologies. Rules written in 1979 to implement the 1977 amendments imposed a minimum
SO2 reduction standard of  90% on high-sulfur coal and 70% on low-sulfur coal at all new
facilities, effectively requiring the use of scrubbers and thereby eliminating the incentive for the
use of low-sulfur coal. So-called “compliance coal” (low-sulfur coal) with an emission rate
below 1.2 lb. SO2 per million Btus remained in demand by facilities built between 1970 andResources for the Future Burtraw
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1977. But for facilities built before 1970 or after 1977, there was no economic incentive or
requirement to use lower-sulfur coal for compliance with environmental goals.
About half of the reductions in sulfur during Phase I of the program have been achieved
by changing to coal with lower sulfur content. A primary explanation, hinging on market
fundamentals, is the low cost of this strategy. Another compelling explanation, hinging on
institutional issues, is that this strategy is relatively non-capital intensive. In a period of
uncertainty regarding the emissions allowance market, cost recovery, and, especially,
competitive pressures facing the entire electricity industry, fuel switching and fuel blending are
low-fixed-cost strategies that allowed affected utilities to comply with little risk.
The market for low-sulfur coal has grown and is expected to continue growing. Low-
sulfur western coal has penetrated midwestern and eastern markets in record quantities, and
eastern low-sulfur coal is being supplied at lower prices than anticipated as a result of increased
mining productivity, lower rail rates, and competition from western mines.
Changes in Rail Transport of Coal
Many analysts have suggested that a large share of SO2 emission reductions achieved in
Phase I were predestined by actions taken before the 1995 start of the allowance trading program
(Ellerman and Montero 1998; Burtraw 1996; Carlson et al. 2000). Emissions from facilities
affected by Phase I totaled 9.3 million tons in 1985, and allowance allocations to these facilities
for Phase I (beginning in 1995) total 6.9 million tons. But by 1993, emissions had already fallen
to 7.5 million tons. This decline was due to demographic shifts in electricity demand toward
areas more proximate to low-sulfur coal, coupled with increased availability of low-sulfur coal
not only as a low-cost compliance option for the SO2 program, but also as a cheaper fuel for
power production at many facilities. Hence the decline in price of low-sulfur coal may well have
stimulated a decline in emissions even in the absence of the SO2 allowance trading program.
 However, Carlson et al. (2000) find that an important portion of potential cost savings
through fuel substitution and trading were unrealized in Phase I. This was due to historical forces
and the traditional regulation of electric utilities, which has been changing rapidly. Because an
important portion of savings was left unrealized, it is difficult to establish what portion of cost
savings that were realized would have occurred absent the program. Given that the incentive to
switch to lower-sulfur coal is greater with the program in place than if the program had not
existed, it is reasonable to assume that the program contributes importantly to the switching to
low-sulfur coal. This is the finding of Carlson et al. (2000), who control for “economicResources for the Future Burtraw
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switching” and find additional switching achieved for compliance with the SO2 allowance
trading program to be much more important.
In any event, it is clear the deregulation of the railroads in the 1980s led to greater
competition among railroads for coal transportation business that emerged just at the time of the
Clean Air Act Amendments. This competition led to a significant decline in coal transport costs,
which is a major component of the delivered price of coal (Carter 1996; Heller and Kaplan
1996). Coal transport is the leading source of revenue for rail freight. The enthusiasm with which
rail has competed for coal transport results from the Staggers Act of 1980 that largely
deregulated railroads. In the 1980s rail rates fell 35%, yet profits went up owing to increased
flexibility in tariffs and increased incentives to reduce costs.
Many observers in the Clean Air Act debates conjectured that bottlenecks would occur in
rail transport that would preclude western coal from playing a big role in compliance plans of
eastern utilities. Hence price forecasts hinged on prices for low-sulfur Appalachian coal that was
locally available to eastern utilities. However, these potential bottlenecks failed to materialize.
Burtraw (1996) reported that investment plans by railroads were realigned after passage of the
CAAA in 1990, and the railroads were anxious to capture a share of the expected rapid growth in
coal transport given the incentive to switch to low-sulfur fuel. Realignment of investment plans
took advantage of new technologies such as increased size of car fleets and unit trains, AC
motors, the laying of double and triple tracks, increased numbers of locomotives, use of
aluminum cars, and increased car dump speed. This is not the usual form of innovation imagined
as part of technical change. However, it does represent a diffusion of new technology and an
organizational adaptation to market opportunity. When investments are realigned, then cost
reductions in one arena are associated with delayed investments and foregone opportunities in
other arenas. It is important to recognize these opportunity costs in order to characterize properly
the costs of regulation. However, the costs are inevitably lower given the incentive and
opportunity to realign investments in this manner.
The primary question, then, is whether opportunities for rail transport of low-sulfur coal
would have existed under a counter-factual environmental regulation using conventional
approaches. A technology standard that took the form of forced scrubbing at major electricity
generating facilities was a leading proposal in the 1980s and characterized new performance
standards after 1979. Clearly this approach would have precluded any advantage to low-sulfur
fuel because scrubbers remove 95% of emissions, rendering the additional cost of low-sulfur fuel
unnecessary.Resources for the Future Burtraw
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A performance standard that established emission rates at plants would have promoted a
large amount of switching to low-sulfur coal, as illustrated by Carlson et al. (2000). However, it
would not have provided an incentive for over-compliance at facilities relatively close to
supplies of low-sulfur coal in order to reduce costs at facilities further away. Hence it would not
have complemented the allowance market or granted as much flexibility to firms as has the SO2
trading program. In summary, the SO2 allowance trading program deserves substantial credit for
not precluding, and arguably for accelerating, environmentally beneficial trends that were
occurring in fuel markets. This outcome would have been unlikely under alternative approaches.
Innovations in Fuel Blending
Blending coals is not as important as switching coals, but blending has provided
significant cost savings. Fuel blending involves mixing high- with low-sulfur coals to reduce
average SO2 emissions. Like fuel switching, fuel blending has lower capital costs than scrubbing.
Generally, electricity-generating facilities are designed for a particular type of coal.
In the late 1980s, it was widely believed that fuel blending was not practical in cyclone
boilers because of the anticipated impact on the operation of the existing plants and boilers.
Deviations in any of several important properties may impair plant performance or harm
equipment. Low-sulfur subbituminous western coal would be most troublesome in this regard,
because it does not share the characteristics of commonly used bituminous coal, including
moisture content, heat content, and ash properties.(Equipment likely to be affected by blending
coals include the coal-handling system, the fuel preparation and firing system, the primary air
system, the steam generator, and the particulate removal system.)
Fuel blending falls soundly into the category of an unanticipated innovation that resulted
from the allowance trading program. Experimentation prompted by the program has led to an
improved understanding of the ability to blend fuels, and the detrimental effects of blending have
been found to be less than originally supposed. While in the late 1980s the rate at which it was
thought low-sulfur subbituminous coals could be blended with high sulfur coal was less than 5%,
today coals are blended at rates of 30-40%. This process innovation was simple to achieve, but it
was unanticipated and resulted from the incentives provided by the allowance trading program.
Innovations in the Scrubber Market
Scrubbers are a capital-intensive post-combustion compliance strategy with a larger
initial cost and lower operating costs than most other strategies. The electric utility industry had
relatively more experience with scrubbers prior to 1990 than with fuel switching and/or blendingResources for the Future Burtraw
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Keohane (2000) finds that capital costs per installed kW of capacity have remained fairly
constant for many years. Taylor (forthcoming) finds that capital costs have declined significantly
over time. In any event, this experience did not foreshadow the fact that under SO2 allowance
trading program, less capacity was needed to achieve roughly equivalent reductions. Previous to
the CAAA, scrubber systems usually included a spare module to maintain low emission rates
when any one module was inoperative. One estimate of capital costs indicates they would
increase by one-third with a spare module (U.S. EIA, 1994, 92). An important innovation in the
scrubber market is the reduced need for spare absorber modules. As long as emission allowances
are a sufficient compliance strategy, utilities can save considerable capital costs by eliminating
the spare module and using allowances during periods of maintenance or unplanned outage. In
addition, new scrubbers exhibit increased efficiency and reliability. Improvements in scrubber
design and use of materials have reduced maintenance costs and increased utilization rates, also
reducing the need for spare modules.
Another significant technical implication of the CAAA is the incentive for improved
efficiency in scrubbing. Increasing SO2 removal from, say, 90–95% can be cost effective
compared to the overall cost of SO2 removal and the opportunity cost of allowances. The
incentives are such that upgrading of existing scrubbers through improvements, including larger
modules and elimination of reheat, is likely to occur (Torrens, Cichanowicz, and Platt 1992,
221–222). These incentives did not exist under previous regulations affecting only new sources.
Keohane (2000) and Taylor (forthcoming) both find that abatement costs per ton of
removal have gone way down, especially in retrofit scrubbers installed for compliance in the SO2
allowance trading program. The retrofit scrubbers burn higher-sulfur coal, which leads to higher
abatement rates and thus lower per-ton costs (assuming some abatement costs are insensitive to
the amount of abatement—i.e., fixed costs of labor and maintenance are tied to the hours of
operation rather than the tons of SO2 removed.)
In addition there is significantly increased utilization of scrubbed units (Ellerman and
Montero 1998; Carlson et al. 2000). Increased utilization is important to reducing the average
cost of scrubbing, because it spreads capital costs over more tons reduced. Previous to the SO2
allowance trading program, scrubbers did not exhibit reliability rates sufficient to achieve the
current level of utilization. The increase in reliability is at least, in part, a response to incentives
provided under the trading program, because of the permit cost savings associated with
incremental reductions in emissions.Resources for the Future Burtraw
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Organizational Innovations
Process changes and realignment of investment priorities are a subtle manifestation of
innovation. An even more subtle, but also significant, type of change has occurred in
organizational behavior—in firms, markets and regulators.
Firms and Markets
In 1990, in many firms, the response to the “revolutionary” (and sometimes deemed
bureaucratically inspired and foolish) SO2 allowance trading program was a conservative one.
The responsibility for compliance with the unprecedented program was given to engineers or
chemists typically charged with environmental responsibilities.6 Unfamiliarity with the new
program led many to pursue a policy of autarky—no trade—and self-sufficiency in compliance
(Bohi, 1994; Bohi and Burtraw 1997; Ellerman 2000; Hart 2000).
Several years later, one can observe responsibility for compliance resting more often with
financial vice presidents, who have learned to treat SO2 emissions allowances as financial assets.
Decisions about how to manage allowance portfolios are treated analogously to decisions about
how to handle fuel purchases; indeed, allowances are often bundled with fuel purchases. Several
companies have developed software to manage their portfolio of emission allowances and to help
make decisions about compliance (U.S. EPA 1996). The result is a much smoother and
administratively less costly mechanism for planning and decision-making within the firm.
Meanwhile, the market for SO2 allowances has matured considerably since the early
1990s. In previous small-scale permit trading experiments in local air quality districts,
transaction costs often approached 30–40% of the value of the permits. Today, the transaction
cost associated with SO2 allowances is about 1% of the value of an allowance. And, the number
of allowances traded virtually doubled each year between 1994 and 1998 (Kruger and Dean
1997).
                                                
6 Stavins and Whitehead (1996) describe the organizational barriers to taking advantage of incentive-based
environmental policies that exist in many firms that are used to conventional approaches to regulation.Resources for the Future Burtraw
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Convenience Value of Allowances
Although allowance trading is not the major form of compliance, the opportunity to trade
allowances has an influence beyond the exchanges that actually occur. Furthermore, even in the
absence of extensive trading, allowances potentially can play a constructive role in facilitating
the optimal timing of investments. Firms considering capital investments in scrubbers may
benefit from the option to delay investments if delay leads to the resolution of uncertainties
pertaining to the planning process (Kaslow and Pindyck 1994). In Phase I, many firms expressed
reluctance to engage in new capital investments, especially given the direction that restructuring
of the electricity industry was likely to take. Chao and Wilson (1993) illustrated a plausible
option value of $85 on allowances valued at the marginal cost of scrubbing (which they assumed
to be a relatively high $400). Allowances also provide insurance against unanticipated events
such as unplanned equipment failures. The insurance value stems from the possibility of stiff
penalties were the utility to be in noncompliance. Hence,  allowances provide sources of value
that were not widely appreciated in the design of the program and that do not hinge on actual
trading.
Regulatory Reform
The reach of innovation extends right into the regulatory administration of the SO2
allowance trading program (Kruger, McLean, and Chen 2000). The U.S. EPA has taken
advantage of exogenous technological change, especially the information revolution, to reduce
administrative costs incurred by the agency and by firms. Monitoring of emissions is achieved
through continuous emission monitors installed on every stack. Data streams into the U.S. EPA
in electronic form and is organized by personal computers and involves a staff that is just a small
fraction the size of staff managing other regulatory programs. The U.S. EPA’s Allowance
Tracking System (ATS) is an electronic system that facilitates enforcement and monitoring by
the agency, industry, and the public. And, industry has learned to use the ATS as a way to
confirm and record the transfer of allowances.
The SO2 allowance trading program is part of a fleet of regulatory changes including
deregulation of the railroads, energy markets, and the electricity industry, and the program has
benefited from these other changes. In particular, ongoing deregulation of the electricity-
generating sector was set in motion by the Energy Policy Act of 1992 and accelerated by the
issuance of Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Order 888 in April of 1996 and related state-
level deregulatory activities. This reform is creating greater competition among electricityResources for the Future Burtraw
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generators and associated pressures to reduce compliance costs, providing greater incentives to
take advantage of the flexibility embodied in the SO2 allowance trading program.
6. Conclusion
This assessment concludes that the SO2 emissions allowance trading program has been an
environmental success. It has achieved 100% environmental compliance and over-compliance in
Phase I. The effect of trading and banking are roughly neutral with respect to the environmental
benefits. An economic assessment of the benefits is that they are substantially greater than the
costs of the program.
Particular interest is focused on the costs of the program because of the innovative design
of the SO2 trading program. Detailed analyses have found that the costs are one-half to one-
quarter of projections. The cost savings are substantial and contribute to the tremendous success
of the program.
Most of the cost savings have been achieved outside the formal allowance market. But
after all, the point of allowance trading is not to trade allowances. The point is to give firms the
flexibility to achieve emission reductions in the least costly manner. The SO2 allowance trading
program gives utilities the incentive and flexibility to capitalize on advantageous trends in fuel
markets. Also, the program has placed numerous options for environmental compliance into
direct competition with each other. This has helped to reduce the cost of compliance.
Innovation in a variety of forms is evident in the SO2 allowance trading program.
Econometric estimates of the magnitude of innovation are difficult to achieve, because they are
not easily separable from other forces that have decreased the cost of compliance. Indeed, to an
important extent the innovation stems from the unprecedented incentive and ability of firms to
take advantage of these other forces of technological change . Further, the innovation that is in
evidence has not been in the nature of patentable discoveries, but rather it is in the form of subtle
process changes and changes in markets and organizational behavior that were seized upon to
reduce costs once the incentive to do so was present.Resources for the Future Burtraw
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